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Abstract
We develop a model of regime dynamics that embeds the principal transition
scenarios examined by the literature. Political systems are a priori unrestricted
and dynamics emerge through the combination and interaction of transition events
over time. The model attributes a key role to beliefs held by political outsiders
about the vulnerability of regimes, governing the likelihood and outcome of tran-
sitions. In equilibrium, transition likelihoods are declining in a regime’s maturity,
generating episodes of political stability alternating with rapid successions of
revolts, counter revolts, and reforms. The stationary distribution of regimes is
bimodal. The model dynamics match the data remarkably well.
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1 Introduction
A growing literature in political economy explores the causes and circumstances of
political transitions. So far, this literature has focused on explaining specific patterns
of regime changes, initiated by either reforms or revolts. In contrast, the unfolding
dynamics of political systems, which result from the combination and interaction of
individual transition events over time, have received little attention. In this paper, we
take a step towards filling this gap, placing the dynamic process of political systems at
the center of analysis.
To this end, we construct a model that integrates the transition scenarios examined by
the previous literature and explore their joint dynamics. We characterize the properties
of the ensuing dynamic system (i.e., the likelihoods and outcomes of transition events),
placing particular emphasis on two questions. First, according to the model, which
types of political systems should be frequent across time or geography? Second, under
which conditions are political transitions likely? Are they evenly spread over time or do
they occur in particular sequences?
Following the literature, we focus on reforms and revolts as means of political
transitions, but explore a substantially enriched space of a priori attainable dynamics.
In particular, our model builds on the seminal paper by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b),
which posits that the threat of revolts is an important cause for democratizing reforms.
Our analysis rests upon two important generalizations.
First, we endogenize the outcome of political transitions. For reforms, we allow for
franchise extensions of arbitrary scope. For revolts, we model a coordination process
that determines the mass of revolting outsiders, who in turn form the newly emerging
regime if a revolt succeeds. In consequence, our model defines a continuous space of
political systems, ranging from single-person dictatorships to full-scale democracies.
All political regimes within this space are, in principle, attainable through political
transitions.1
Second, to ensure that revolts and reforms co-exist along the equilibrium path, we
introduce an information asymmetry regarding the regime’s vulnerability to a revolt.
1As is common in the politico-economic literature, we characterize political systems by the fraction
of the population with access to political power. Examples for regimes where political power is
concentrated in the hands of exclusive elites are, e.g., Chile (1973–90) and today’s North Korea. The
majority of the population is, by contrast, enfranchised in most Western democracies. Regimes between
the two extremes, where parts of the population is deprived from political rights in an otherwise
inclusive system, are, e.g., Hungary (1921–31) and Madagascar (1960–72).
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In equilibrium, this leads insiders to sometimes take “tough stance” rather than to
negotiate on moderate reforms when facing revolutionary pressure, opening the door
for revolts along the equilibrium path.
Although simple in its nature, the model provides a unified framework that allows for
the principal transition scenarios discussed in the previous literature: (i) democratization
(a move from autocratic regimes to democratic ones); (ii) reversely, the collapse of
democracies; and (iii) the replacement of autocracies by other autocracies. The purpose
of this paper is to study the properties of the equilibrium process of political systems
unfolding in this environment.
Regime dynamics In the model, the likelihood of transitions crucially hinges on
how vulnerable the regime is perceived to be by political outsiders. To illustrate this
as cleanly as possible, we first consider a baseline version of our model where we treat
the prior of political outsiders regarding the regime’s vulnerability as exogenous. In
this environment, if it is a priori unlikely that the regime is vulnerable to a revolt,
few outsiders find it worthwhile to support a revolt, posing a negligible threat to the
regime, and reforms and revolts are ultimately unlikely. When, by contrast, a regime is
perceived to be vulnerable, more outsiders are in principle willing to support a revolt,
which in turn also increases the regime’s incentives to reform. In equilibrium, this
translates into a non-trivial likelihood of either type of transition.
The link between prior beliefs and transition likelihoods suggests a crucial role for
learning dynamics in shaping the timing of transitions. Specifically, if the institutional
characteristics underlying the vulnerability of a regime are persistent, then outsiders
may not only learn from the regime’s contemporaneous actions, but also from the
history of political transitions (or the absence of these). In most of this paper, we
explore a version of our model where we allow for such learning dynamics.
The main insight regarding the timing of regime changes is a negative relationship
between the likelihood of observing a transition and the maturity of a regime. The
reason for this finding is that both reforms and revolts are more likely to occur when a
regime is vulnerable, whereas the absence of a transition is a sign of internal stability.
Accordingly, outsiders gradually become more and more convinced that a regime is
invulnerable as it matures, reducing their willingness to revolt. Once a transition
eventually occurs, however, outsiders rationally believe the new regime to be relatively
more vulnerable, entailing a rise in the likelihood of further transitions.
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A consequence of the negative relation between a regime’s hazard rate and its
maturity is that transition events tend to be clustered across time, giving rise to
episodes of political stability alternating with episodes of political turbulence. Political
turbulences may encompass rapid successions of reforms, revolts, and counter revolts as
well as gradual democratization episodes through a series of reforms.
In the model, political turbulences pose critical junctures in the evolution of political
systems: On the one hand, the outcome of such episodes is largely determined by
small and random variations in current states. On the other hand, the type of political
system that eventually survives an episode of political turbulence is likely to persist for
a long time. Small variations in initial conditions can therefore translate into persistent
differences in future political systems (see also Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
Another prediction of the model is what is sometimes labeled as the “iron law
of oligarchy”. Because outsiders believe mature regimes to be invulnerable, mature
regimes in turn find it generally attractive to abstain from reforms regardless of their
true vulnerability. Accordingly, mature regimes are bound to eventually fall by means
of a revolt and to be succeeded by an autocratic regime.
The flipside of this result is that the typical path to democracy starts with a revolt
triggering a critical juncture. However, because revolts are likely to be small, the event
that ultimately establishes a democracy is usually a reform. This is consistent, e.g.,
with the observation of Karl (1990, p. 8) that no stable South American democracy has
been the result of mass revolutions (see also Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter,
1973; Huntington, 1991).
Invariant distribution At an aggregate level, perhaps the most salient characteristic
of the process defining the regime dynamics is its invariant distribution. According
to our model, the distribution of political systems across time is bimodal with mass
concentrated on autocratic and democratic political systems and with little mass on
intermediate polities. The model identifies two forces underlying the bimodal shape of
the invariant distribution.
First, there is a polarization of political systems during their emergence, with
transitions resulting in regimes that tend to be either autocratic or democratic. In
particular, observing concessions in the form of a reform, outsiders in the model conclude
that the regime is weak. Accordingly, small reforms fuel coordination amongst outsiders
along the intensive margin, while doing little to reduce revolutionary pressure along the
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extensive margin. To be effective, reforms thus need to be far-reaching, leading to the
establishment of fairly democratic regimes with little opposition.
In contrast, the model predicts that revolts result in fairly autocratic regimes. This is
because revolts with widespread support that are likely to succeed would be preempted
by insiders. On the other hand, revolts that are likely to fail cannot grow too large
either, since only a small set of outsiders with sufficiently high gains from revolting
would be willing to take the risk of supporting an ill-fated revolt.
The second force underlying the bimodal shape of the long-run distribution is
a persistence of both autocracies and democracies relative to intermediate types of
systems. Democracies are more likely to survive (though not indefinitely2) due to a lack
of meaningful opposition. Autocracies, by contrast, face higher transition probabilities
than democracies, in particular when they are young, but these transitions are likely to
lead to a succession of an autocratic regime by another autocracy. While the identity
of autocratic leaders may change more frequently, autocratic systems therefore tend to
survive over time.
Comparison to the data Breaking down the political dynamics into different statis-
tics, our model makes a number of predictions about the relation between political
systems, their age, the frequency of transitions, and the invariant distribution of political
systems. While the main focus of this paper is theoretical, we also take an exploratory
look at empirical regime dynamics using data on the majority of countries from 1919
onwards and compare them to the model’s predictions.
Regarding the outcomes of transitions, we document that in the data political
transitions lead to a polarization of political systems similar to the model, and that
the long-run distribution of polities is indeed bimodal. Regarding frequencies, the data
provides evidence for the decline in a regime’s hazard rate over time and supports
the model’s predictions on the relation between stability and the political system in
place. Overall, the match of the model’s predictions to their empirical counterparts
is remarkably good. Hence, even though our empirical analysis does not allow us to
identify the causal forces for political transitions, we conclude that our model provides a
useful tool that is able to generate key empirical properties describing political dynamics
within a simple analytical framework.
2Even though democratic regimes enfranchise the majority of the population, there is typically a
small group of oppositional “hardliners” in equilibrium that will eventually succeed in overthrowing
even the most democratic political system.
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Related literature To study the dynamics of political system, our work combines
standard ingredients of political economy models that have so far predominantly been
studied in isolation. In particular, the preemptive logic of democratic reforms in
our paper is based on the seminal work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b), Conley
and Temini (2001), as well as Boix (2003).3 Further work allows this rationale for
democratic reforms to co-exist with revolts initiated by political outsiders or powerful
minorities which are directed either against democratic political systems (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2001) or against autocracies (Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010;
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000a; Ellis and Fender, 2011). From these papers, the latter
two are closest to ours in that they also relate the co-existence of reforms and revolts
to the presence of asymmetric information between political insiders and outsiders.
However, all these papers focus on specific, exogenously imposed transition patterns
and, with the exception of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), also abstract from repeated
transitions. Our paper contributes to this literature by relaxing these restrictions, which
is crucial for exploring regime dynamics.
This paper also relates to the literature on gradual enfranchisement by Justman and
Gradstein (1999), Jack and Lagunoff (2006), and Gradstein (2007) as well as the work
on the stability and dynamics of coalitions by Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008, 2012,
forthcoming), which permit multiple transition events within rich spaces of political
regimes. However, these papers either restrict transitions to be reforms (in dynamic
voting games) or do not specify the transition mechanism in detail. In contrast, our
model makes explicit predictions regarding the relative importance of both revolts and
reforms as drivers of political dynamics, allowing us to relate the mode of transitions to
the characteristics of the resulting regimes.4
Finally, modeling revolts as coordination games has a long tradition (Granovetter,
1978, Kuran, 1989, and the discussion of Morris and Shin, 1998, by Atkeson, 2000) and
many authors have emphasized that the information available to potential revolutionaries
may spur or hinder coordination (e.g. Lohmann, 1994, Chwe, 2000, Bueno de Mesquita,
3A related strand of the democratization literature argues that reforms may also be reflective of
situations where autocratic decision makers are better off in a democratized political system than
under the status quo (e.g., Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; and Llavador
and Oxoby, 2005). On the empirical side, Przeworski (2009), Aidt and Jensen (2014), and Aidt and
Franck (2015) provide evidence suggesting that preemptive reforms are indeed the driving force behind
democratization. In a similar spirit, Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol (2014) show theoretically and
empirically that a higher risk to lose political power induces leaders to conduct constitutional reforms.
4In this sense, we also relate to Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2012, 2014) who show that con-
sensual transitions foster civil liberties and property rights provisions in contrast to violent transitions.
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2010, or Fearon, 2011). In such contexts, political leaders have obvious incentives to
manipulate public signals directly, as in the works of Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006)
and Edmond (2013), or to carefully consider the information costs associated with their
policies, as in our model. Indeed, Finkel, Gehlbach and Olsen (2015) show empirically
that halfhearted preemptive reforms may fuel revolts by raising the expectations of
success among disenfranchised parts of the population, and increase the willingness to
coordinate on rebellion.
Layout The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline
economy with exogenous priors. Section 3 characterizes the likelihood and outcomes
of transitions conditional on the prior. Section 4 extends the model to the case with
endogenous priors. Sections 5 and 6 contain our main results on regime dynamics
and the long-run properties of political systems. Section 7 compares the theoretical
predictions to the data, and Section 8 concludes. Technical details are confined to the
appendix.
2 The model with exogenous priors
In this section we set up our baseline model. The model is based on the previous
literature, focusing on reforms and revolts as a driver of political transitions. The main
novelty is that the model unifies the principal transition scenarios discussed in the
previous literature within a simple, dynamic framework.
2.1 Setup
We consider an infinite horizon economy with a continuum of two-period lived agents.
Each generation has a mass equal to 1. At time t, fraction λt of the population has the
power to implement political decisions, whereas the remaining agents are excluded from
political power. We refer to these two groups as (political) “insiders” and “outsiders”.
When born, the distribution of political power among the young is inherited from
their parent generation; that is, λt agents are born as insiders, while 1− λt agents are
born as outsiders. However, agents who are born as outsiders can attempt to overthrow
the current regime and thereby acquire political power. To this end, outsiders choose
individually and simultaneously whether or not to participate in a revolt. Because all
political change will take effect at the beginning of the next period (see below), only
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young outsiders have an interest in participating in a revolt. Accordingly, we denote
young outsider i’s choice by φit ∈ {0, 1} and use the aggregated mass of supporters,
st =
∫
φit di, to refer to the size of the resulting revolt.
Given the mass of supporters st, the probability that a revolt is successful is given
by
p(θt, st) = θth(st), (1)
where θt ∈ Θ is a random state of the world that reflects the vulnerability of the
current regime or their ability to put down a revolt, and h is an increasing and twice
differentiable function, h : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with h(0) = 0. That is, the threat of a revolt
to the current regime is increasing in the mass of its supporters and in the vulnerability
of the regime. When a revolt has no supporters (st = 0) or the regime is not vulnerable
(θt = 0), it fails with certainty.
The purpose of θt in our model is to introduce asymmetric information between
insiders and outsiders that, as will become clear below, ensures that revolts are prevalent
along the equilibrium path. Formally we have (for now) that the state θt is exogenously
distributed on Θ = [0, 1], is i.i.d. from one period to the next, and is revealed to insiders
at the beginning of each period. Outsiders only know the prior distribution of θt. We
assume that θ has a differentiable distribution function F with F ′(θ) > 0 for all θ in
the interior of Θ.
After they learn θt, insiders may try to alleviate the threat of a revolt by conducting
reforms. We follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) by modeling these reforms as
an extension of the franchise to outsiders, which is effective in preventing them from
supporting a revolt.5 Aiming to endogenize the political system λt, we, however,
generalize this mechanism by allowing insiders to continuously extend the regime by
any fraction, xt − λt, of young outsiders, where xt ∈ [λt, 1] is the reformed political
system. Because preferences of insiders will be perfectly aligned, there is no need to
specify the decision making process leading to xt in detail.
Given the (aggregated) policy choices st and xt, and conditional on the outcome of
5That it is indeed individually rational for enfranchised outsiders to not support a revolt is shown
in Appendix B.
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st if the regime is overthrown, and
xt otherwise.
(2)
When a revolt fails (indicated by ηt = 0), reforms take effect and the old regime stays in
power. The resulting political system in t+1 is then given by xt. In the complementary
case, when a revolt succeeds (ηt = 1), those who have participated will form the new
regime. Accordingly, after a successful revolt, the fraction of insiders at t+ 1 is equal
to st. Note that this specification prevents non-revolting outsiders from reaping the
benefits from overthrowing a regime so that there are no gains from free-riding in our
model.
To complete the model description, we still have to specify how payoffs are distributed
across the two groups of agents at t. As for outsiders, we assume that they receive
a constant per period payoff of γit which is privately assigned to each agent at birth
and is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This heterogeneity is meant to
reflect differences in the propensity to revolt, possibly resulting from different degrees
of economical or ideological adaption to a regime.
In contrast, insiders enjoy per period payoffs u(λt), where u is twice differentiable,
u′ < 0, and u(1) is normalized to unity. We think of u(·) as a reduced form function
that captures the various benefits of having political power (e.g., from extracting a
common resource stock, implementing preferred policies, etc.).6 One important feature
of u is that it is decreasing in the current regime size and, hence, extending the regime
is costly for insiders (e.g., because resources have to be shared, or preferences about
policies become less aligned). Another thing to note is that u(λt) ≥ γit for all λt and
γit; that is, being part of the regime is always desirable. In the case of full democracy
(λt = 1) all citizens are insiders and enjoy utility normalized to the one of a perfectly
adapted outsider.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that members of an overthrown regime and
6More specifically, u should be interpreted as a value function where all policy choices associated
with having political power—except enfranchising political outsiders—are replaced by optimal policy
rules. In particular, this applies to all question about the organization of the economy, resource
reallocation, or (similarly) the design of political institutions used to enfranchise outsiders. Subsuming
these issues into u allows us to tractably focus on the inherent dynamics of political systems spanned
by political reforms and revolts. Notice, however, that all other policy choices still affect our analysis
inasmuch as they determine the shape of u (see also the discussion in Footnote 12).
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participants in a failed revolt are worst-adapted to the new regime (γit = 0).
For the upcoming analysis it will be convenient to define the expected utility of
agents that are born at time t, which is given by:
V I(θt, λt, st, xt) = u(λt) + [1− p(θt, st)]× u(xt), (3)
V O(θt, γit, st, φit) = γit + φit p(θt, st)× u(st) + (1− φit)× γit, (4)
where superscript I and O denote agents that are born as insiders and outsiders,
respectively. In both equations, the first term corresponds to the first period payoff
(unaffected by the policy choices of the young agent’s generation), while the other terms
correspond to second period payoffs. (Since agents do not face an intertemporal tradeoff,
we do not need to define a discount rate here.)
The timing of events within one period can be summarized as follows:
1. The state of the world θt is revealed to insiders.
2. Insiders may extend political power to a fraction xt ∈ [λt, 1] of the population.
3. Observing xt, outsiders individually and simultaneously decide whether or not to
participate in a revolt.
4. Transitions according to (1) and (2) take place, period t+ 1 starts with the birth
of a new generation, and payoffs determined by λt+1 are realized.
We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria. To increase the predictive
power of our model, we impose two equilibrium refinements. First, we rule out “instable”
equilibria where st = 0, but iteratively best-responding to a perceived infinitesimal
change in st would lead to a first-order change in st.
7 Second, we limit attention to
equilibria that are consistent with the D1 criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987),
a standard refinement for signaling games. The D1 criterion restricts outsiders to believe
that whenever they observe a reform x′ that is not conducted in equilibrium, the reform
7In a previous version of this paper (Buchheim and Ulbricht, 2014), we demonstrate that this
restriction is formally equivalent to characterizing the set of trembling-hand perfect equilibria. An
alternative (and outcome-equivalent) approach to rule out these instabilities would be to restrict
attention to equilibria which are the limit to a sequence of economies with a finite number of outsiders,
where each agent’s decision has non-zero weight on st.
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has been implemented by a regime with vulnerability θ′, for which a deviation to x′
would be most attractive.8
Anticipating some equilibrium properties, we simplify our notation as follows. First,
outsiders’ beliefs regarding the regime’s vulnerability will be uniquely determined in
our setup. We therefore denote the commonly held belief by θ̂t, dropping the index i.
Second, there are no nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria in our game (see the
proofs to Propositions 1 and 2). Accordingly, we restrict notation to pure strategies.
This leads to the following definition of equilibrium for our economy.
Definition. Given a history δ = {λ0}∪ {{φiτ : i ∈ [0, 1]}, θτ , xτ , ητ}
t−1
τ=0, an equilibrium
in this economy consists of strategies xδ : (θ, λ) 7→ x and {φiδ : (θ̂, x) 7→ φi}
1
i=0, and
beliefs θ̂δ(λ, x) 7→ θ̂, such that for all possible histories δ:
a. Reforms xδ maximize insider’s utility (3) given states (θt, λt), beliefs θ̂δ, and
outsiders’ strategies {φiδ : i ∈ [0, 1]};
b. Each outsider’s revolt choice φiδ maximizes (4) given insiders’ reforms xδ, other
outsiders’ revolt choices {φjδ : j ∈ [0, 1] \ i}, and the corresponding beliefs θ̂δ;
c. Beliefs θ̂δ are obtained using Bayes rule given xδ, and θ̂δ satisfies the D1 criterion;
d. States (λt, ηt) are consistent with (1) and (2);
e. Coordination among outsiders is stable in the sense that iteratively best responding
to a perceived change in st by mass ǫ > 0 only changes the equilibrium coordination
by outsiders by mass ν ≥ 0, with ν → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
2.2 Political equilibrium
We now derive the equilibrium strategies of insiders and outsiders, pinning down the
political equilibrium in the model economy. Our analysis is simplified by the overlapping
generations structure of our model, which gives rise to a sequence of “generation games”
8Formally, let V̄ I(θ′, λt) be the insiders’ payoff in a candidate equilibrium when the regime has a
vulnerability θ′. Then the D1 criterion restricts beliefs to the state θ′ that maximizes Dθ′,x′ = {θ̂ :
V I(θ′, λt, s(θ̂, x
′), x′) ≥ V̄ I(θ′, λt)}, where s(θ̂, x
′) is the mass of outsiders supporting a revolt, given
the beliefs θ̂ and reform x′. Dθ′,x′ is said to be maximal here, if there is no θ
′′, such that Dθ′,x′ is
a proper subset of Dθ′′,x′ . That is, beliefs are attributed to the state in which a deviation to x
′ is
attractive for the largest set of possible inferences about the regime’s vulnerability (implying that the
regime gains most by deviating).
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between young insiders and young outsiders. Since the distribution of political power
at time t captures all payoff-relevant information of the history up to t, the only link
between generations is λt. We can therefore characterize the set of equilibria in our
model by characterizing the equilibria of the generation games as a function of λt.
All other elements of the history up to time t may affect the equilibrium at t only
by (hypothetically) selecting between multiple equilibria (if the equilibrium in the
generation game would not be unique).
The generation game consists of two stages that determine the political system at
t+ 1. In the second stage, outsiders have to choose whether or not to support a revolt.
Because the likelihood that a revolt succeeds depends on the total mass of its supporters,
outsiders face a coordination problem in their decision to revolt. In the first stage, prior
to this coordination problem, insiders decide on the degree to which political power
is extended to outsiders. On the one hand this will decrease revolutionary pressure
along the extensive margin by contracting the pool of potential insurgents. On the
other hand, extending the regime may also contain information about the regime’s
vulnerability. As a result, reforms may also increase revolutionary pressure along the
intensive margin by increasing coordination among outsiders who are not subject to
reforms. Insiders’ policy choices will therefore be governed by signaling considerations.
We proceed by backward induction in solving for the equilibrium of the generation
game, beginning with the outsiders’ coordination problem.
Stage 2: Coordination among outsiders Consider the outsiders’ coordination
problem at time t. Without loss of generality, define θ̂t ≡ Et{θt} ∈ Θ.
9 For any given
belief, (θ̂t, ŝt) ∈ Θ× [0, 1], individual rationality requires all outsiders to choose a φit
that maximizes their expected utility Et{V
O(·)}. At time t, outsider i with adaption
utility γit will therefore participate in a revolt if and only if
γit ≤ p(θ̂t, ŝt) u(ŝt) ≡ γ̄(ŝt). (5)
Here γ̄(ŝt) is the expected benefit of participating in a revolt that is supported by a
mass ŝt of outsiders. Since γ̄(ŝt) is independent of γit, it follows that in any equilibrium
the set of outsiders who support a revolt at t is given by the agents who are least
adapted to the current regime. Suppose for the time being that γ̄(ŝt) ≤ 1. Then, γ̄(ŝt)
9From our specification of p, V O is linear in θt. For the purpose of computing Et{V
O}, Et{θt} is
therefore a sufficient statistic for the full posterior distribution of θt.
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defines the fraction of young outsiders that participates in a revolt, and, therefore, the
size of a revolt, st, that would follow from γ̄(ŝt) is given by
st = (1− xt) γ̄(ŝt). (6)
Further note that in any equilibrium it must hold that st = ŝt. Therefore, as long
as γ̄(ŝt) ≤ 1, the share of outsiders that support a revolt at t has to be a fixed point to
(6). To guarantee that this is always the case and to further ensure that a well-behaved
fixed point exists, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption A1. For ψ(s) ≡ h(s) · u(s),
a. ψ′ ≥ 0 and ψ′′ ≤ 0;
b. lims→0 ψ
′(s) = ∞.
Intuitively, Assumption A1 states that participating in a revolt becomes more
attractive as the total share of supporters grows; i.e., the participation choices of
outsiders are strategic complements. This requires that the positive effect of an
additional supporter on the success probability outweighs the negative effect of being in
a slightly larger regime after a successful revolt. To ensure existence, we further require
that the positive effect of an additional supporter is sufficiently strong when a revolt is
smallest, and is decreasing as revolts grow larger.
Using Assumption A1, the above discussion together with our stability requirement
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, the mass of outsiders supporting a revolt at time t
is uniquely characterized by a time-invariant function, s : (θ̂t, xt) 7→ st, which satisfies
s(0, ·) = s(·, 1) = 0, increases in θ̂t, and decreases in xt.
All proofs are in the appendix. Proposition 1 establishes the already discussed
tradeoff of conducting reforms: On the one hand, reforms reduce support for a revolt
along the extensive margin. In particular, in the limit where regimes reform to a
full-scaled democracy, any threat of revolt is completely dissolved. On the other hand,
if reforms signal that a regime is vulnerable, they may backfire by increasing support
along the intensive margin.
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Stage 1: Reforms by insiders We now turn to the insiders’ decision problem.
Since more vulnerable regimes have higher incentives to reform than less vulnerable
ones, conducting reforms will be associated with being intrinsically weak and, therefore,
indeed increase coordination along the intensive margin. For the benefits along the
extensive margin to justify these costs, reforms have to be far-reaching, inducing regimes
to enfranchise a large proportion of the population whenever they conduct reforms.
The following proposition summarizes the resulting equilibrium schedule of reforms.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium, policy choices of insiders and beliefs of outsiders
are uniquely characterized by time-invariant functions x : (θt, λt) 7→ xt, ξ : θt 7→ ξt,





λt if θt < θ̄(λt)


















E{θt|θt ≤ θ̄(λt)} if xt = λt
θ̄(λt) if λt < xt < ξ(θ̄(λt))
ξ−1(xt) if ξ(θ̄(λt)) ≤ xt ≤ ξ(1)
1 if xt > ξ(1),
where ξ′ > 0 with ξ(θt) > λt + µ for all θt > θ̄(λt) and some µ > 0, and θ̄(λt) > 0 for
all λt.
Proposition 2 defines insiders’ policy choices for generation t as a function of (θt, λt).
Because the logic behind these choices is the same for all values of λt, we can discuss
the underlying intuition keeping λt fixed. To this purpose, Figure 1 plots reform choices
(left panel) and the implied probability to be overthrown (right panel) for a given λt.
It can be seen that whenever a regime is less vulnerable than θ̄(λt), insiders prefer to
not conduct any reforms (i.e., xt = λt), leading to a substantial threat for regimes with
θt close to θ̄(λt). Only if θt ≥ θ̄(λt), reforms will be conducted (xt = ξ(θt)), which
in equilibrium effectively mitigates the threat to be overthrown, ruling out marginal
reforms where ξ(θt) → λt.
To see why marginal reforms are not effective in reducing revolutionary pressure
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Figure 2. Equilibrium beliefs and implied mass of insurgents.
mass of insurgents (right panel) as functions of xt. If the political system is left
unchanged by insiders, outsiders only know the average state θ̂poolt ≡ E{θ|θ ≤ θ̄(λt)} of
all regimes that pool on xt = λt in equilibrium. On the other hand, every extension of
the regime—how small it may be—leads to a non-marginal change in outsiders’ beliefs
from θ̂poolt to θ̂t ≥ θ̄(λt) and, hence, results in a non-marginal increase in revolutionary
pressure along the intensive margin. It follows that there exists some x̃(λt), such that
for all xt < x̃(λt) the increase of pressure along the intensive margin dominates the
decrease along the extensive margin. Thus, reforms smaller than x̃(λt) will backfire and
increase the mass of insurgents (as seen in the right panel of Figure 2), explaining why
effective reforms have to be non-marginal.
Furthermore, optimality of reforms requires that the benefit of reducing pressure
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compensates for insiders’ disliking of sharing power. Because x̃(λt) > λt, it follows
that u(x̃(λt)) < u(λt). Moreover, any reform marginally increasing the regime beyond
x̃(λt) leads only to a marginal increase in the likelihood to stay in power. Hence, there
exists a non-empty interval, given by [x̃(λt), ξ(θ̄(λt))], in which reforms are effective, yet
insiders prefer to gamble for their political survival in order to hold on to the benefits of
not sharing power in case they survive. This explains the substantial threat for regimes
with θt close to θ̄(λt), as seen in the right panel of Figure 1.
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Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium Propositions 1 and 2 uniquely pin
down all policy choices in every state, which in turn determine the evolution of political
systems. We conclude that there is no scope for multiple equilibria in our model.
Verifying that an equilibrium exists, then permits us to reach the following conclusion.
Proposition 3. There exists an equilibrium, in which for all histories δ, policy map-
pings xδ and {φiδ}
1
i=0, as well as beliefs θ̂δ correspond to the time-invariant mappings
underlying Propositions 1 and 2. Furthermore, for any given initial political system λ0,
the equilibrium is unique.
3 Likelihood and outcomes of transitions
We begin our analysis of regime dynamics by investigating the properties of political
transitions conditional on the current regime λt (and conditional on the exogenous
prior of outsiders). By Proposition 3, policy mappings are time-invariant, implying
that (λt, θt) is a sufficient statistic for characterizing the transition dynamics of the
political system from time t to t+ 1. Integrating out θt, political systems in the unique
equilibrium follow a Markov process Q(λt,Λ) where Q is the probability that λt+1 ∈ Λ






+ {1 − ρS(λt) − ρ
R(λt)} × ✶λt∈Λ. (7)
10More precisely, gambling for survival increases the likelihood to be overthrown in two ways. First,
since at the margin more vulnerable regimes join the pool at xt = λt, these regimes obviously face a
high threat by not conducting reforms. Second, since these regimes also shift the pooling belief towards
pooling regimes being more vulnerable, the threat further increases for regimes of all vulnerabilities in
the pool (reflected by an upward-rotation of the revolt probability for pooling regimes around zero).
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Here, ρS and ρR are the probabilities that in state λt a transition occurs via revolts or
reforms; QS and QR are conditional transition functions (specifying the probability that
in state λt the system λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges from a revolt or reform); and ✶ is an indicator
function equal to unity whenever λt ∈ Λ.
11 Accordingly, the first term in (7) defines
the probability that system λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges through a revolt, the second term defines
the probability that λt+1 ∈ Λ emerges from a reform, and the third term indicates the
event of no transition.
Parametrization Before proceeding, let us introduce a simple parametric example,
which we will use for all simulations throughout the paper. For this, let
u(λt) = − exp(λtβ1) + β0 and h(st) = s
α
t .
Here one may think of β0 as a common resource stock or some other private benefits that
decline at an exponential rate β1 as power is shared with more insiders. The parameter
β1 thus measures the costs of enfranchising political outsiders. In practice, we expect
these costs to be high for resource-rich and less developed economies.12 To reduce the
number of free parameters, further suppose that ψ′(1) = 0; i.e., the strategic effect of an
additional outsider supporting a revolt becomes negligible when revolts are supported
by the full population. Together with our assumptions on u and h, this pins down α
and β0 in terms of β1, which is restricted to approximately satisfy β1 ∈ (0, 0.56).
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For β1 close to its lower bound, reforms are essentially free and there will be a single,
comprehensive reform at t = 0 that leads to an (almost) universal democracy. For β1
close to its upper bound, reforms will be prohibitively expensive and regime dynamics
will be exclusively driven by revolts. For all illustrations throughout the main paper, we
set β1 to an intermediary value of 0.385 that is chosen to roughly match the empirical
distribution of autocratic regimes relative to democratic ones (see Section 6 for details).




p̃(λ, θ) dF (θ) QS(λ,Λ) = ρS(λ)−1
∫
{s̃(λ,θ)∈Λ}




(1− p̃(λ, θ)) dF (θ) QR(λ,Λ) = ρR(λ)−1
∫
{x(λ,θ)∈Λ\{λ}}
(1− p̃(λ, θ)) dF (θ).
12In particular, we expect that in modern production economies with strong labor complementarities
and high capital returns a commitment to honor property rights by enfranchising outsiders generates
positive effects on aggregate income. In particular, property rights are likely to encourage enfranchised
outsiders to acquire human capital, to supply high-skilled labor, or to invest their savings. We therefore
expect u′ to be small when elites profit from these benefits, mitigating the costs of sharing power.
13In particular, α = β1 exp(β1) and β0 = exp(β1) + 1, restricting β1 ∈ (0, exp(−β1)) ≈ (0, 0.56).
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Some alternative parametrization are discussed in Appendix D.
Outcomes of transitions Using (7), the type of political systems that emerge from
transitions are defined by the conditional transition functions QS and QR. From
Proposition 2 it is clear that reforms in state λt will be bounded below by ξ(θ̄(λt)),
since smaller reforms would be ineffective in reducing revolutionary pressure as they
would increase coordination of outsiders along the intensive margin. Accordingly,
there is an interval [0, λ̄Rλ ] that is not attained by reforms originating in state λ; i.e.,
QR(λ, [0, λ̄Rλ ]) = 0. Similarly, revolts cannot grow too large, since otherwise insiders
would prefer to preempt them.14 In particular, effectiveness of reforms implies that
revolts will be bounded above by s(θ̂poolt , λt), implying Q
S(λ, [λ̄Sλ , 1]) = 0 for some λ̄
S
λ .
In a previous version of this paper (Buchheim and Ulbricht, 2014, Proposition 4),
we have shown for uniform F that λ̄Rλ > 1/2 and λ̄
S
λ < 1/2 for all λ. That is, regardless
of the originating regime, reforms would always result in regimes where a majority of
citizens holds political power, whereas revolts would always result in autocracies with a
small elite ruling over a majority of political outsiders. Figure 3 illustrates the uniform
case using the parametric example introduced above. Here we plot the conditional
distributions of political systems that emerge from reforms and from revolts.15
From the left panel, it becomes apparent that approximately two types of autoc-
racies emerge after revolts: dictatorships, corresponding to regimes that emerge after
revolts against democracies, and autocracies which emerge after succeeding other non-
democratic regimes. The right panel, in turn, displays the distribution of political
systems after reforms, which only has positive weight on fairly democratic political
systems. Clearly visible, there is a set of intermediate political systems, reaching from
λ̄S ≈ 0.22 to λ̄R ≈ 0.87, that do neither emerge from reforms, nor from revolts.
While the finding that λ̄Rλ > 1/2 and λ̄
S
λ < 1/2 does not generalize to non-uniform
distributions of θ, the observed polarization pattern generally pertains. Figure 4
illustrates this for the case where θ is drawn from a Beta distribution. The figure
plots the smallest reforms (solid lines) and largest revolt (dashed lines) that may occur
14More precisely, insiders would preempt large revolts if they are vulnerable. Accordingly, outsiders
know the regime to be resistant in the absence of reforms, so that joining a revolt becomes risky and
only outsiders with high potential gains from revolting—i.e., low realizations of γi—are willing to take
the risk. This further reduces the chances of success, reducing the support even more, etc.
15The reported distributions weight the transition functions, QS(λt, ·) and Q
R(λt, ·), with the
invariant distribution of λt. E.g., letting Ψ denote the invariant distribution, the distribution of




































Figure 4. Smallest reforms (solid) and largest revolts (dashed) for different distributions of θt.
along the equilibrium path, whereas each point on the curves represents a different
parametrization of the Beta distribution defining F . In particular, the left panel shows
how the bounds change for different unconditional means of θ, holding the variance of
θ fixed at its uniform value of 1/12 (e.g., for µ = 1/2, the plot shows λS ≈ 0.22 and
λS ≈ 0.87 as seen in Figure 316). The right panel repeats the exercise for a more precise
distribution of θ where we set the variance to 1/50.
In both panels, for low values of µ, outsiders’ expect the regime to be strong,
implying small revolts and the absence of reforms (θ̄ = 1). As prior mass is shifted
towards intermediate levels of θt, the impact of revealing θt by conducting reforms
16The uniform distribution is a special case of the Beta distribution with shape parameters a = b = 1
or, equivalently, with moments µ = 1/2 and σ2 = 1/12.
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on beliefs becomes smaller, so that conducting small reforms becomes increasingly
attractive for sufficiently high levels of θt. Eventually, as prior mass is shifted towards
unity (and to the right side of θ̄), the impact of conducting reforms on beliefs becomes
again larger, so that again only large reforms are effective in reducing revolutionary
pressure. This explains the U-shape of λ̄R and inverse U-shape of λ̄S. Comparing the
left panel to the right, it can be seen that for more precise priors, both larger revolts
and smaller reforms are feasible along the equilibrium path whenever the regime is a
priori likely to be vulnerable.
An interesting implication of these results is that democracies tend to arise only
by means of reforms. By contrast, even the largest revolts typically lead to at most
intermediate-sized regimes that require further reforming in order to become fully
democratic. In that sense the commonly made assumption in the previous literature
that democracies are established by means of reforms is an endogenous outcome in our
model. In Section 7 we will see that this is also largely in line with the data.
Likelihood of transitions Along with the conditional transition functions, regime
dynamics are defined by the likelihoods of reforms and revolts. In the model, rev-
olutionary pressure becomes naturally negligible as regimes become fully inclusive
(limλ→1 ρ
S(λ) = 0), which in turn reduces incentives to reform (limλ→1 θ̄(λ) = 1).
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These forces are amplified by the intensive margin of revolutionary pressure which,
conditional on beliefs, reinforces any change in the extensive margin. That is, as regimes
become more inclusive and prospective support for revolts falls, also incentives to
support a revolt decline, leading to correspondingly less supporters and hence even less
revolutionary pressure. In sum, there is a strong force of stabilization for democratic
regimes.
Yet, the likelihood of political transitions for democracies is not necessarily zero.
This is because the limit case of a fully inclusive regime might never emerge along the
equilibrium path. In general, whether or not λ = 1 is emerging along the equilibrium
path depends on whether ξ(1) = 1 or ξ(1) < 1. Whenever ξ(1) < 1, there always remains
a small fraction of outsiders that in principle is willing to participate in subversive
attempts, implying a small but positive probability of a regime reversal. In our example
we have ξ(1) = 0.988, so that there is indeed a small probability of observing reversals—
17To see this, observe that θ̄(λ) defines the largest θ̄ such that V I(θ̄, λ, s(E{θ|θ ≤ θ̄}, λ), λ) ≥
V I(θ̄, λ, s(θ̄, ξ(θ̄)), ξ(θ̄)). Since both sides of the inequality are continuous in θ̄ and λ, so is λ 7→ θ̄,
















Figure 5. Likelihood of revolts and reforms for different political systems λt (uniform prior).
even for the largest feasible democracy along the equilibrium path.18 In the next
sections, we will demonstrate that young democracies are particular prone to such
reversals, once we allow for θt to persist from one period to the next.
In contrast to democracies, the likelihood of transitions is generally bounded away
from zero for autocracies. On the one hand, a large fraction of outsiders poses significant
threats, which due to the discussed incentives of small regimes to “gamble for their
survival” translate into sizable equilibrium revolts. On the other hand, the flipside of
large equilibrium threats is that once regimes become sufficiently vulnerable (θ > θ̄(λ)),
they face strong incentives to conduct reforms.19
Figure 5 illustrates these points, plotting the transition likelihoods of revolts ρS and
reforms ρR as a function of the current regime type λt. Both mappings are decreasing, so
that autocracies are significantly more likely than democracies to experience a transition
of either type. Accordingly, autocracies are on average relatively short-lived due to
their high transition probabilities. (This last point will be qualified in the next section,
where autocracies can become stable once they become sufficiently mature.)
Nevertheless, even if individual autocracies are short-lived, there is a tendency for
autocracies to persist across regimes. This is because after a revolt against an autocratic
regime, the succeeding regime will be very similar to its predecessor as becomes evident
from Figure 3. Hence, while the identity of autocratic leaders may change frequently
18Evaluated at the invariant distribution of polities, the implied probability of a regime reversal
against democracies is 0.42 percent per period.
19For priors F which place a lot of mass on stable regimes, reforms will be completely off the
















Figure 6. Likelihood of revolts and reforms for different distributions of θt. The likelihoods are
plotted for λ = 0.5 and σ2 = 1/12. The likelihoods for other values of λ and σ are similar in shape,
whereas magnitudes decrease in σ and λ.
over time, autocratic systems tend to be persistent across regimes.
Finally, consider the impact of distributional shifts in the prior towards more
vulnerable states. Similar to how such a shift affects QS and QR, it also increases the
likelihood of transitions: If a regime appears to be immune to revolts, outsiders consider
it indeed unattractive to revolt; accordingly, the regime has no incentives to reform.
As a regime is perceived to be more vulnerable, both the probability of revolts and
reforms initially increase until eventually the threat grows so large that the regime
conducts inclusive reforms in almost every state and revolts disappear in equilibrium.
Importantly, due to a regime’s incentive to gamble for its survival, there is an interim
region, where both revolts and reforms co-exists with significant probabilities. Figure 6
illustrates this relation.
4 The model with endogenous priors
The preceding analysis suggests that the prior beliefs of outsiders are an important
determinant for the likelihood of transitions and their outcome. So far we have
exogenously specified the prior of outsiders by imposing a distribution for θt that is
i.i.d. across time. We now relax this assumption, allowing the institutional characteristics
underlying a regime’s vulnerability to persist from one period to the next. This will
naturally give rise to fluctuations in the priors of outsiders over time.




{λ0} ∪ {xt, st, ηt}
t
τ=0 denote the publicly observable partition of the history at the end
of date t. For any δpt , outsiders form a posterior about θt|δ
p
t using Bayes rule, which
in turn pins down their prior belief θt+1|δ
p
t at date t + 1. One technical challenge is
that posterior beliefs of outsiders will generally not conjugate with their prior, making
it difficult to keep track of beliefs in a dynamic setting. We address this challenge by
backward-engineering F , such that the prior of outsiders is always Beta-distributed.20
In particular, let µ̂t and σ̂
2
t denote the first two moments of outsiders’ posterior θt|δ
p
t
at date t. Similarly, let µt+1 and σ
2
t+1 denote the first two moments of outsiders’ prior
θt+1|δ
p
t at date t+ 1. Our assumption is that F is such that the prior of outsiders can
be parametrized by a Beta distribution, so that
µt+1 = πµ̂t + (1− π)µ0 (8)
σ2t+1 = πσ̂
2
t + (1− π)σ
2
0 + π(1− π)(µ̂t − µt)
2 (9)
for some π ∈ (0, 1) and µ0, σ0 > 0 where σ
2
0 < µ0(1− µ0).
21 Intuitively this states that
the first two moments of outsiders’ beliefs evolve as if the state θt+1 is left unchanged
with probability π, and is otherwise drawn from a fixed distribution with mean µ0 and
variance σ20. For F to implement these beliefs, it suffices to set F (·|δt) equal to the cdf
of a Beta distribution with moments equal to µt+1 and σ
2
t+1. With this in mind, we
henceforth use F (·|δt) to interchangeably refer to both the true distribution of θt and
the prior of outsiders.22
20This is similar to the approach used by Straub and Ulbricht (2013) who, within a Gaussian prior
setting, engineer a distribution of signal noise to retain normality across periods.
21Here the restriction σ20 ≤ µ0(1− µ0) is statistically necessary for µ0 and σ0 to be valid moments
of a distribution on [0, 1]. The strict inequality version further ensures that for any history δt, there
indeed exist shape parameters at and bt that parametrize a Beta distribution with moments µt+1 and
σ2t+1 (see Appendix C for details).
22Given that F (·|δt) affects actions only through the prior of outsiders this is without consequence
for the equilibrium (similar, all reported distributions will be measurable with respect to δpt , so that
by Bayesian consistency there is no consequence either). Since µt+1 and σ
2
t+1 are measurable with
respect to δpt , a literal interpretation of this approach implies that outsiders can infer the current
distribution of θt+1 directly from observing δ
p
t , without needing to actually invoke Bayes law. But,
of course, computing F (·|δt) requires the same updating steps that agents would have gone through
if θt were indeed following the above-described mixture process. Our approach therefore shifts the
responsibility of updating beliefs from the model’s agents to the analyst, where in the role of the latter
we carefully design F so that the first two prior moments of agents are consistent with the moments
that would follow from agents invoking Bayes law in the presence of the described mixture process
for θt. An alternative interpretation is that θt indeed follows a mixture process and that beliefs are
approximated by matching the first two moments to a Beta distribution, similar to the approximation
approach outlined by Krusell and Smith (1998).
22
Learning dynamics Introducing learning affects the equilibrium dynamics by adding
the prior moments µt and σ
2
t as additional state variables to the Markov process defined
in (7). Conditional on (µt, σ
2
t ) the previous equilibrium characterization in Section 2.2
remains fully valid.
In particular, it holds that for any prior (µt, σ
2
t )—or, equivalently, for any distribution
F (·|δt)—the transition process at date t is described by the (previously time-invariant)
versions of QS, QR, ρS and ρR that would arise for F = F (·|δt). The equilibrium
dynamics are therefore completely determined by (7) and the law of motion for µt and
σ2t that is implicit in (8) and (9).
Appendix C provides a detailed characterization of µt and σ
2
t as a function of
(µt−1, σ
2
t−1) and the events at date t − 1. Intuitively, µt is small when there is no
transition event and is high after a transition is observed. Specifically, reforms and
revolts against reforming regimes fully reveal the state θt, which conditional on a reform
is larger than θ̄t−1, so that µt > πθ̄t−1+(1−π)µ0. Similarly, Bayesian updating implicates
that the regime is likely to be vulnerable when a revolt is observed in the absence
of reforms. In contrast, when neither a reform nor a revolt are observed, Bayesian




µt|(reformt−1) ≥ µt|(revoltt−1) > µt|(no transitiont−1). (10)
Regarding σ2t , we have that uncertainty is smallest after reforms and revolts against
reforming regimes. The ordering of σ2t between no transition event and revolts in the
absence of reforms depends on the precise prior distribution.
5 Regime dynamics
We are now ready to explore the emerging dynamics of political regimes. Relative to
the conditional properties explored in Section 3, learning across periods now adds an
implicit dependence of transition likelihoods and outcomes on the current regime’s
maturity. The next subsection characterizes this relation, before discussing the emerging
transition patterns in Subsection 5.2.
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5.1 Regime maturity and likelihood of transitions
In Section 3 we have seen that regimes that are perceived to be vulnerable (large µt) are
more likely to face reforms or revolts than regimes that are perceived as invulnerable.
Combining this with (10), young regimes tend to be less stable than more mature ones
conditional on λt.
Figure 7 illustrates this distinction between young and mature regimes, plotting the
likelihoods of reforms ρRt (left panel) and revolts ρ
S
t (right panel) as a function of λt and
conditional on whether there was a reform (solid), a revolt (dashed), or no transition
event (thin dotted lines) at date t − 1.23 It is apparent how the likelihood of either
transition type is higher immediately after a transition compared to when the regime
was already in place the previous period (see below for an intuition about the shapes).
Figure 8 further illustrates this point by averaging the likelihoods across λt and
plotting them against the maturity of a regime. It can be seen that the hazard rates
for either transition type are generally decreasing in the maturity of the regime. This is
because outsiders’ prior means µt converge towards µ0 in each period without a transition
event, while observing any type of transition is a signal of political vulnerability.
5.2 Patterns of regime changes
We now discuss the types of transition patterns that can emerge in equilibrium. To
have an example at hand, we simulated the model to generate a random time series of
300 periods. Figure 9 shows the resulting regime dynamics. The top panel plots the
political system, λt, at time t and indicates the dates where transitions occur via revolts
(marked by ∆) and reforms (marked by ×). The middle and bottom panel further plot
the corresponding hazard rates, ρR and ρS.
Critical junctures From Figure 9 it is evident how transition events tend to be
clustered across time, giving rise to episodes of political stability (periods 45–173,
176–215 and 239 to end) and episodes of political turbulence that are characterized by
rapid successions of revolts, counter revolts, and reforms (2-44, 174–175 and 216–238).
23The figure is plotted using the same parametrization introduced in Section 3. Throughout, the
learning parameters are set to π = 0.99, µ0 = 2/5 and σ0 ≈ 1/4 (or, equivalently, a0 = 1, b0 = 3/2),
implying a highly persistent distribution of θt with a slow drift towards a moderate vulnerability of 2/5.
All distributions and conditional likelihoods in Figures 7–12 are evaluated at the invariant equilibrium


















Figure 7. Likelihood of revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel) conditional on λt and conditional















Figure 8. Likelihood of revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel) conditional on the maturity τ of
the current regime and conditional on that the regime was originally established via reform (solid line)
or via revolt (dashed line).
This clustering is a direct consequence of the decline of hazard rates in a regime’s
maturity.
In the model, political turbulences are triggered by small probability transition
events against mature regimes.24 Once triggered, such episodes pose critical junctures in
24More generally, political turbulences are ultimately caused in our model by a change in outsiders’
sentiment that causes them to perceive the regime to be more vulnerable. In that sense critical
junctures could also be the result of exogenous shifts in outsiders’ beliefs, for instance caused by the
deaths of political leaders which are known to increase the likelihood of political transitions (Jones
and Olken, 2009; Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol, 2014). While it would be straightforward to
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Figure 9. Simulated time series of the model with learning. Notes: Reforms are marked by “×”,
successful revolts are marked by “△”. Middle and lower panels display the hazard rates of reforms and
revolts. Black dots in the graph of ρR indicate truncation of 0.35, 0.80 and 0.96 at 0.1, respectively.
the sense that small and random variations in current conditions may cause persistent
differences in future political systems (e.g., notice how the similar looking critical
junctures starting in period 2 and period 216 eventually lead to a stable autocracy and
democracy, respectively). On the one hand, this is because the outcome of political
turbulences is largely determined by the random variables θt and ηt and further hinges
on small variations in the current state λt, µt and σ
2
t (e.g., whether θ̄(λt, µt, σ
2
t ) is
slightly above or below θt). On the other hand, because democracies and autocracies
both stabilize once they become mature, the type of political system that eventually
survives an episode of political turbulence is likely to persist for a long time.
Gradual reforms and counter revolts From the previous discussion it follows
that newly established democracies first go through a phase of instability, before they
sake of simplicity.
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eventually stabilize. Specifically, young democracies face heightened threats of counter
revolts (see the solid line in the right panel of Figure 7 in comparison to the dotted line).
While fully consolidated democracies tend to be stable, “transitional” democracies are
therefore prone to regime reversals (period 237 in Figure 9).
The flipside of these regime reversal is that young democracies have strong incentives
to conduct further reforms, in particular if the initial reform was small (see solid lines in
the right panels of Figures 7 and 8). The model can thus generate patterns of gradual
democratization (periods 230–233 in Figure 9) that are similar to the predictions by
Jack and Lagunoff (2006), Justman and Gradstein (1999), and Gradstein (2007).25
Revolutions and democratization Based on the model, what are viable paths to
democracy? We have seen in Figure 4 that the most inclusive political systems are
always established via reform. Yet, in the model with learning, revolts can become
quite large in some states of the world.26 In particular after counter revolts against
reforming regimes, the newly emerged autocracy is known to be vulnerable with high
precision, helping outsiders to coordinate and thus leading to large revolts (c.f., the
right panel of Figure 4).
However, even though there are large revolts, regimes that emerge from revolts are
far away from being inclusive and, in addition, are known to be vulnerable. Whether
or not a major revolt may ultimately lead to democratization therefore depends on
whether the resulting regime chooses to reform before it falls to a counter revolt. As it
turns out, the probability of observing a reform after a revolt is decreasing in the size
of the preceding revolt (the dashed line in the right panel of Figure 7), reflecting again
that more inclusive regimes are less vulnerable to revolutionary threats.
As the flipside of a downward sloping probability for reforms is an upward sloping
likelihood of revolts (the dashed line in the left panel of Figure 7), it is, ultimately,
unlikely that a large revolt leads to democratization. This is consistent with, e.g.,
25Underlying the possibility for gradual enfranchisement in our model is that reforms reveal the
current vulnerability of the regime, increasing coordination along the intensive margin. Accordingly,
the likelihood of survival of future regimes becomes highly sensitive to adverse changes in θt, providing
strong incentives to conduct further reforms in such an event. Our model thus provides a completely
different rational for gradual enfranchisement compared to the literature on dynamic voting games. In
these models, the current median voter needs to delegate power to another median voter to implement
her preferred policy, but chooses a path of gradual enfranchisement due to the anticipation of further
franchise extensions conducted by her “preferred” median voter.
26In our parametrization the largest revolt along the equilibrium path is supported by approximately
one third of the entire population. While equally sized revolutions are also possible when θt is i.i.d.,
this would require a parametrization in which transitions occur almost exclusively via revolts.
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the observation of Karl (1990, p. 8) that no stable South American democracy has
been the result of mass revolutions (see also Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell and Schmitter,
1973; Huntington, 1991). Below, we will provide further empirical evidence that mass
revolutions leading to democracies are indeed the rare exception.
Iron law of oligarchy Finally, the characterization above implies that regimes
consolidate their power as they mature, meaning that µt converges to its baseline value
µ0 over time. Once µt is sufficiently low, however, regimes prefer to abstain from
reforms for (almost) all instability levels and the probability of reforms drops (close) to
zero (c.f., right panel of Figure 8). Accordingly, the likelihood of a “direct” route to
democratization is low and (mature) autocracies are bound to be eventually succeeded
by another autocratic regime—a pattern that is sometimes dubbed as the “iron law
of oligarchy”. In the context of our model, the path to democratization therefore
necessarily leads through a critical juncture, whereas mature regimes are bound to
fall—if ever—to a revolt (periods 174 and 216 in Figure 9).27
6 Long-run distribution of political systems
We now discuss the distribution of political systems that should be expected in the
long-run. The key implication of both the model with and without learning is that the
long-run distribution of political systems is bimodal with mass being concentrated on
the extremes. Figure 10 displays the long-run distribution for the model with learning.
Similar results hold for the model without learning and are discussed in Appendix D.28
Specifically, it can be seen that our parametrization (see Section 3) yields about equal
mass on both autocratic and democratic regimes. While different parametrizations shift
mass between autocratic and democratic systems, the overall bimodal shape is always
preserved.
To see what is underlying the bimodal shape recall from Section 3 that the model
gives rise to a polarization of political regimes during their emergence and a tendency
27In line with our discussion in Footnote 24, critical junctures are not necessarily tied to transition
events. A shift in beliefs may thus well lead to enfranchisement directly out of a state of oligarchy.
28While both versions of the model yield qualitatively similar results, the model without learning
requires parametrizations with significant higher frequencies of revolts in order to generate nontrivial
mass on the autocratic side of the political spectrum. Since learning introduces a mechanism for
autocracies to stabilize, the model naturally gives rise to more mass on the autocratic spectrum, while








Figure 10. Invariant distribution of political systems in the model with learning.
for both autocratic and democratic systems to persist across time. For an illustration
consider Figures 11 and 12 where we display the conditional distributions of newly
emerging regimes and the marginal likelihood of reforms and revolts as a function of λt
(the counterparts to Figures 3 and 5 in our baseline model). Clearly, the model with
learning shows the same type of polarization forces discussed in Section 3, which lays
out the grounds for the bimodal shape of the long-run distribution.29
The initial polarization of regimes is reinforced by the higher persistence of extreme
political systems as compared to intermediate ones, which is driven by two effects. First,
as in the baseline model, repeated successions of autocratic regimes via revolts introduce
a persistence of autocratic systems that exceeds the stability of individual autocratic
regimes. Second, the model with learning also gives rise to hump-shaped likelihoods
of reforms and revolts as visible in Figure 12. This is because intermediate political
systems are statistically most likely to inherit an intermediate vulnerability from their
predecessor, since predecessors with low values of θt are unlikely to transform and
predecessors with high values of θt are choosing farther-reaching reforms. Due to their
intermediate stability and their limited inclusiveness, these regimes face a substantial
threat of revolts and, as a consequence, have high incentives to reform.
29Due to the nature of the time-varying priors in the model with learning and the resulting shifts
in QR and QS the outcomes, in particular for reforms, are more smooth and have wider support



























Figure 12. Likelihood of revolts and reforms for different regimes λt in the model with learning.
7 A look at the data
Our model makes a number of predictions about the relation between political systems,
their age, the frequency of transitions, and the distribution of political systems in the
long-run. In this section, we take an exploratory look at the empirics of regime dynamics
using data on the majority of countries from 1919 onwards. We explore the empirical
counterparts to the predicted model relations. While we make no claim on causality,




To empirically explore regime dynamics, we combine information on the inclusiveness
of political systems (the empirical counterpart to λt) with information on transition
events. As a measure for the inclusiveness, we use the polity variable, scaled to [0, 1],
from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), which ranks political regimes
on a 21 point scale between autocratic and democratic.30
To classify successful revolts, we use the Archigos Dataset of Political Leaders
(Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009). The dataset is available for the years between
1919 and 2004, which defines the overall time frame of our panel. We record a successful
revolt if a leader is irregularly removed from office due to domestic popular protest,
rebel groups, or military actors (defined by Archigos’ exitcodes 2, 4 and 6), and if at
the same time the leader’s successor takes office in irregular manner (defined by an
entrycode 1). Furthermore, we take a revolt to be causal for a change in the political
system if a change in the political system is recorded in the Polity IV database within
a two week window of the revolt.31
Finally, we use the dataset on the Chronology of Constitutional Events from the
Comparative Constitution Project (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, 2010) to classify
reforms. We define reforms by a constitutional change (evnttype equal to new, reinstated,
or amendment) accompanied by a change in the political system (as indicated by the
variable durable from the Polity IV Project) that is not matched to a revolt or another
irregular regime change from the Achigos Dataset. To be consistent with the model’s
definition of reforms, we restrict attention to positive changes.
The resulting dataset is a daily panel on the country level, which covers 175 countries
and records 251 revolts and 97 reforms.
30In contrast to our model, the de facto distribution of political power may sometimes differ from the
de jure scope of the franchise. For this reason, we use the polity index to measure political power as it
attempts to measure the de facto scope of the franchise—which is the relevant aspect of the model’s
concept of political power—using various proxies regarding the openness of political institutions to
participation. Alternatives based on a de jure interpretation of constitutions such as data on the formal
right to vote from the Comparative Constitution Project (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, 2010) or data
on electoral turnout from the Polyarchy Index (Vanhanen, 2000) are less useful for this purpose.
31To prevent the data from generating a mechanical correlation between revolts and small polity scores,
we use the polity score at the end of periods indicated by the Polity IV Project to be “transitionary”







Figure 13. Distribution of political systems since World War I.
7.2 Empirical properties of political systems and transitions
At the aggregate, the long-run distribution generated by our model matches the shape
of the empirical distribution of political systems in our dataset (shown in Figure 13).
Comparing Figure 13 with Figure 10, both distributions are bimodal, with mass
concentrated mainly on autocratic and democratic political systems.
The model identifies two forces underlying the bimodal shape of the long-run dis-
tribution. First, political transitions are subject to polarization: Reforms establish
predominantly democratic political systems, while revolts mainly establish autocracies.
Figure 14—the empirical counterpart to Figure 11—shows that political systems emerg-
ing from revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel) share a similar shape with their
theoretical counterparts. In particular, revolts are indeed by and large autocratic, while
the modal political system established via reforms is democratic (right panel).
Second, democratic and autocratic regimes are more stable than intermediate types
of political systems, reflected in theoretical transition likelihoods that are hump-shaped
in the inclusiveness of the political systems (Figure 12). Figure 15 shows that a similar
pattern can be seen in the data.
In the presence of learning, our theory also predicts a negative correlation between
transitions and the maturity of a regime. Analogously to Figures 7 and 8, Figures 16 and
17 relate the empirical frequency of transitions to the maturity of regimes. Specifically,
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Figure 15. Annual empirical likelihood of revolts and reforms.
transition for young regimes (between two and five years of age) conditional on being
established via reform (solid lines) or revolt (dashed lines), as well as for mature regimes
(older than five years; dotted lines).32 It can be seen that transitions are far more
frequent when there was a recent transition compared to the case when a regime is
mature. Similarly, Figure 17 relates the frequency of reforms and revolts directly to the
age of a regime, showing that consistent with the theoretical predictions the frequencies
are (i) decreasing, with (ii) similar levels for reforms (right panel) and (iii) higher
probabilities to observe revolts after revolts than after reforms (left panel).
In sum, even though we cannot identify the true forces of political transitions, our
32To avoid conclusions from very small samples, we restrict the support of young regimes to systems
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Figure 16. Annual empirical likelihood of revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel) for political
systems between two and five years of age established via reform (solid lines) or revolt (dashed lines)
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Figure 17. Annual empirical likelihood of revolts (left panel) and reforms (right panel) for political
systems established via reform (solid lines) or revolt (dashed lines) as function of regime age in years.
model does a remarkably good job in matching central observable properties of the
data. In this sense, it provides a useful tool by providing a mechanism that describes
regime dynamics as if they were generated by the model.
One objection to this conclusion, however, could be that the descriptive statistics
shown so far are mainly driven by the cross-sectional variation in the data, while the
model predicts these to arise through transition dynamics of individual countries over
time. In the remainder of this section, we hence complement our graphical analysis by
panel regressions including year and country fixed effects and show that our results do
not rely on either times of global political instability or country specific effects.
34
Table 1. Empirical results controlling for country and year fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)














∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.052∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.009




Polityt × Revolt-Episode 0.083
∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.014)
Polityt × Reform-Episode −0.044 −0.071
∗∗
(0.027) (0.030)
Age in 25 yrs −0.001 −0.005∗∗ −0.002 −0.005∗∗ −0.001 −0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Control variables
Episode-Dummy No No No No No No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes.— All parameters estimated via OLS. Number of observations are 3 289 400 country-days. Standard errors
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the change in
the polity index between date t and t+ 1. The dependent variables in Columns 3 to 8 are dummies indicating whether
a revolt or reform is observed at date t. Revolt-Episodes (Reform-Episodes) indicate regimes that are established via
revolt (reform). Coefficients and standard errors in Columns 3–8 are multiplied by 365.25 to indicate annual likelihoods.
Level of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 substantiate the finding that revolts and reforms lead
to a polarization of political systems. Specifically, Column 1 shows that revolts lead, on
average to a decrease in the polity index of 0.06 points, while reforms lead to an increase
of 0.39 points. Column 2 further dissects these average effects by conditioning on the
polity index of the originating regime. It can be seen that revolts against all regimes
with an index value greater than 0.2/0.7 ≈ 0.29 have a negative effect on the future
polity with large reverting effects against democratic regimes. Reforms, in contrast,
do not affect the political system by much when they are conducted within already
democratic societies (0.56− 0.59×polityt = 0 for polityt = 0.94), but represent a major
push towards democracy otherwise. In the absence of transition events, the current
political system has naturally no impact on political change.
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In the remaining columns of Table 1 we investigate the proximate determinants
of the likelihood of regime transitions identified by the model. First, note that, in
general, transitions become less likely with the age of the regime. However, this effect is
statistically significant for the probability of reforms only, owing possibly to the limited
number of regimes observed for each country.
Second, Columns 3 and 5 confirm that the probability of revolts is a hump-shaped
function of the polity index with its maximum at the center of the polity scale, as shown
in the left panel of Figure 14. Columns 4 and 6 verify the observation from the right
panel of Figure 14 that the probability of reforms has a similar shape but a somewhat
stronger negative slope overall.
Finally, we examine the more subtle prediction of the model that autocratic regimes—
typically established via revolts—are more inclined to gamble for political survival if
they represent a larger share of the population, while democratic regimes—established
via reforms—become uniformly more stable the more inclusive they are. This prediction
implies that the probability of revolt is increasing in the polity index for regimes that
originate from a revolt and decreasing in the polity index for regimes originating from a
reform. The probability of reform, in contrast, should be declining in the inclusiveness
of the regime in revolt-episodes and be approximately constant in reform-episodes
(Figure 7). The results in Column 7 and 8 of Table 1 show that, with the exception
of the constant reform hazard in reform episodes, these predictions can be reconciled
with within-country variation in the frequency of regime transitions. Overall, the panel
regressions thus confirm the close match between even quite subtle predictions of our
model and the data.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper explores regime dynamics in a simple model where transitions (or their
absence) are governed by signaling and learning considerations. Although simple in its
nature, the model provides a unified framework that allows for the principal transition
scenarios examined by the previous literature. Along the equilibrium path, the model
features episodes of—possibly gradual—democratization, regime reversals against both
transitional and mature democracies, and successions of autocratic regimes.
The model predicts a number of central properties of regime dynamics. First,
political dynamics are characterized by a Markov process where the likelihood of
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transitions decreases in a regime’s age, giving rise to extended periods of political
stability that alternate with politically turbulent times. The model is thus able to
explain why—even though autocracies tend to be less stable than democracies—some
autocratic leaders have been in power for a long time. Second, the model emphasizes
that political transitions lead to a polarization of political regimes, which is reinforced
by transition likelihoods being hump-shaped in the political system in place (conditional
on a regime’s age). Third, the model also predicts that for mature regimes, the only
transitions that occur with positive probability are revolts establishing autocracies. This
result gives an underpinning to what is sometimes called the “iron law of oligarchy”.
We also provide a first assessment of whether the specific features that shape
the model dynamics are present in the data. To this end, we dissect the process of
political systems into various conditional statistics, which we compare to their empirical
counterparts using data on political systems and transitions. Even though the model is
rather stylized, its predictions are remarkably close to the observations from the data.
The good empirical fit suggests that the model may represent a useful foundation
for more quantitative studies of regime dynamics. For instance, it may be worth to
explore potential microfoundations for the gains from political power u, the opportunity
cost of revolting γ, or the benefits of coordination h. Relating these primitives of the
model to, e.g., the presence of resource rents, the degree of economic development,
or communication technologies the model could be used to account for differences in
regime dynamics across geography or time.
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Appendices (for online publication)
A Equilibrium characterization (proofs)
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first establish that any solution to the outsiders’ coordination problem is a fixed point to
equation (6). From our discussion in the main body of the paper it is clear that this is the
case if and only if γ̄(ŝt) ≤ 1 for all ŝt. From Assumption A1 it follows that γ̄ is increasing in
ŝt, and therefore γ̄(ŝt) ≤ 1 holds if γ̄(1) = p(θ̂t, 1)u(1) ≤ 1. Since u(1) = 1 and p(·) ∈ [0, 1]
this is indeed the case.
Let f(ŝt) ≡ (1− xt) γ̄(ŝt). Then, since f(0) = 0 for all (θ̂t, xt) ∈ Θ× [0, 1], there always
exists a fixed point to (6) at ŝt = 0. When θ̂t = 0 or xt = 1, then f(ŝt) = 0 for all ŝt, and
therefore ŝt = 0 is obviously the only—and therefore stable—fixed point to (6). On the other
hand, when θ̂t 6= 0 and xt 6= 1, then from Assumption A1 f
′(0) > 1, so that iteratively best
responding to any perceived ŝt = ε > 0 leads to the stable equilibrium s
∗
t > 0 defined below.
Having ruled out ŝt = 0 as a solution to the coordination problem for θ̂t 6= 0 and xt 6= 1,
we now show that there is a unique, stable ŝt > 0 solving (6) for θ̂t 6= 0 and xt 6= 1. From
γ̄ ∈ [0, 1] it follows that f is bounded by its support, [0, 1− xt]. Moreover, by Assumption A1
we have that limŝ→0 ψ
′(ŝ) = ∞, implying that limŝ→0 f
′(ŝ) = ∞. Hence, there exists a s̃ > 0,
such that f(s̃) > s̃. Together with continuity of ψ (and thus of f), it follows that there exists
a strictly positive fixed point to (6), which by concavity of ψ (and thus of f) is unique on
(0, 1]. Let s∗t = f(s
∗
t ) denote this fixed point. Clearly, it must hold that f




The above arguments establish that st is uniquely determined by a (time-invariant) function
s : (θ̂t, xt) → st. It remains to be shown that ∂s/∂θ̂t ≥ 0 and ∂s/∂xt ≤ 0. Given that st is a
fixed point to (6), we have that
π(st, xt) ≡ st − (1− xt) θ̂t ψ(st) = 0.

























Since ψ is bounded by ψ(1) = 1, (6) implies that lim
θ̂t→0
s∗t = limxt→1 s
∗
t = 0, and
therefore the case where θ̂t = 0 or xt = 1 is a limiting case of θ̂ 6= 0 and xt 6= 1. From
the implicit function theorem it then follows that s is differentiable on its whole support.
Moreover, the previous arguments imply that f(s̃) > s̃ for all s̃ < s∗t and f(s̃) < s̃ for all
s̃ > s∗t , implying that f
′(s∗t ) < 1 or, equivalently, ∂γ̄/∂st < (1−xt)
−1 at s∗t . Thus ∂πt/∂st > 0
for all (θ̂t, xt) ∈ Θ× [0, 1], which yields the desired results.
Finally, while we focus on pure strategies above, it is easy to see that the proposition
generalizes to mixed strategies. By the law of large numbers, in any mixed strategy equilibrium,
beliefs about s are of zero variance and, hence, the arguments above apply, implying that all
outsiders, except a zero mass i with γi = γ̄(s
∗
t ), strictly prefer φi = 0 or φi = 1. We conclude
that there is no scope for (nondegenerate) mixed best responses.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds by a series of lemmas. To simplify notation, in what follows we drop λt
as an argument of x and θ̂ where no confusion arises. Furthermore, we use Ṽ I(θt, θ̂t, xt) =
(1− θth(st))u(xt) to denote insider’s indirect utility (up to a constant u(λt)), as follows from
st = s(θ̂t, xt) given Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. x is weakly increasing in θt.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that x(θ′′) < x(θ′) for θ′ < θ′′. Let x′ ≡ x(θ′), x′′ ≡ x(θ′′), u′ ≡
u(x′), u′′ ≡ u(x′′), h′ ≡ h(s(θ̂(x′), x′)), and h′′ ≡ h(s(θ̂(x′′), x′′)). Optimality of x′ then requires
that Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x′′), x′′) ≤ Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x′), x′), implying u′h′ − u′′h′′ ≤ (u′ − u′′)/θ′ < (u′ − u′′)/θ′′,
where the last inequality follows from θ′ < θ′′ and u′ < u′′. Hence, Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x′′), x′′) ≤
Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x′), x′) implies that Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x′′), x′′) < Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x′), x′), contradicting optimality of
x′′ for θ′′.
Lemma 2. Suppose x is discontinuous at θ′, and define x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ
′ + ε) and x+ ≡
limε↓0 x(θ
′ + ε). Then for any x′ ∈ (x−, x+), the only beliefs consistent with the D1 criterion
are θ̂(x′) = θ′.
Proof. Let θ′′ > θ′, and let x′′ ≡ x(θ′′). Optimality of x′′ then requires that Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x′′), x′′) ≥
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Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x+), x+) and, thus for any θ̃,
Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̃, x′) ≥ Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x′′), x′′) implies that
Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̃, x′) ≥ Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x+), x+) .
Moreover, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 1,
Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̃, x′) ≥ Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x+), x+) implies that
Ṽ I(θ′, θ̃, x′) > Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x+), x+) .
Hence, if Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̃, x′) ≥ Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x+), x+) = V̄ I(θ′′), then Ṽ I(θ′, θ̃, x′) > Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x+), x+) =
V̄ I(θ′). Therefore, Dθ′′,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′,x′ if θ
′′ > θ′. (For the definition of Dθ,x,
see Footnote 8.) A similar argument establishes that Dθ′′,x′ is a proper subset of Dθ′,x′ if
θ′′ < θ′ and, thus, the D1 criterion requires that θ̂(x′) = θ′ for all x′ ∈ (x−, x+).
Lemma 3. There exists θ̄(λt) > 0, such that x(θt, λt) = λt for all θt < θ̄(λt). Moreover,
x(θ′′) > x(θ′) > λt + µ for all θ
′′ > θ′ ≥ θ̄(λt) and some µ > 0.
Proof. First, consider the existence of a connected pool at xt = λt. Because for θt = 0, xt = λt
dominates all xt > λt, we have that x(0) = λt. It follows that there exists a pool at xt = λt,
because otherwise θ̂(λt) = 0 and, therefore, p(·, s(θ̂(λt), λt)) = 0, contradicting optimality of
x(θ) > λt for all θ > 0. Moreover, by Lemma 1, x is increasing, implying that any pool must
be connected. This proves the first part of the claim.
Now consider x(θ′′) > x(θ′) for all θ′′ > θ′ ≥ θ̄(λt) and suppose to the contrary that
x(θ′′) ≤ x(θ′) for some θ′′ > θ′. Since x is increasing, it follows that x(θ) = x+ for all
θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′] and some x+ > λt. W.l.o.g. assume that θ
′ is the lowest state in this pool.
Then Bayesian updating implies that θ+ ≡ θ̂(x+) ≥ E{θt|θ
′′ ≥ θt ≥ θ
′} > θ′ and, therefore,
Ṽ I(θ′, θ−, x+) > Ṽ I(θ′, θ+, x+) for all θ− ≤ θ′. Hence, because θ′ prefers x+ over x(θ−), it
must be that x(θ−) 6= x+ for all θ− ≤ θ′ and, hence, x(θ−) < x+ by Lemma 1. Accordingly,
let x− ≡ maxθ−≤θ′ x(θ
−). Then from continuity of Ṽ I and θ+ > θ′ it follows that there
exists an off-equilibrium reform x′ ∈ (x−, x+) with Ṽ I(θ′, θ′, x′) > Ṽ I(θ′, θ+, x+). Hence, to
prevent θ′ from choosing x′ it must be that θ̂(x′) > θ′. However, from Lemma 2 we have that
θ̂(x′) = θ′, a contradiction.
Finally, to see why there must be a jump-discontinuity at θ̄(λt) note that
Ṽ I(θ̄(λt),E{θt|θt ≤ θ̄(λt)}, λt) = Ṽ
I(θ̄(λt), θ̄(λt), x(θ̄(λt))); otherwise, there necessarily exists
a θ in the neighborhood of θ̄(λt) with a profitable deviation to either λt or x(θ̄(λt)). From
the continuity of Ṽ I and the non-marginal change in beliefs from E{θt|θt ≤ θ̄(λt)} to θ̄(λt) it
follows that x(θ̄(λt)) > λt + µ for all λt and some µ > 0.
43
Lemma 4. x is continuous and differentiable in θt on [θ̄(λt), 1].
Proof. Consider continuity first and suppose to the contrary that x has a discontinuity
at θ′ ∈ (θ̄(λt), 1). By Lemma 1, x is monotonically increasing in θt. Hence, because x
is defined on an interval, it follows that for any discontinuity θ′, x− ≡ limε↑0 x(θ
′) and
x+ ≡ limε↓0 x(θ
′) exist, and that x is differentiable on (θ′ − ε, θ′) and (θ′, θ′ + ε) for some
ε > 0. Moreover, from Lemmas 2 and 3 it follows that in equilibrium θ̂(x′) = θ′ for all
x′ ∈ [x−, x+]. Hence, Ṽ I(θ′, θ′, x−) = Ṽ I(θ′, θ′, x+), since otherwise there necessarily exists
a θ in the neighborhood of θ′ with a profitable deviation to either x− or x+. Accordingly,
optimality of x(θ′) requires Ṽ I(θ′, θ′, x′) ≤ Ṽ I(θ′, θ′, x−) and, thus, Ṽ I(θ′, θ′, x−) must be
weakly decreasing in x. Therefore, ∂Ṽ I/∂θ̂t < 0 and limε′↓0 ∂θ̂(x
− − ε′)/∂xt > 0 (following
from Lemma 3) imply that limε′↓0 ∂Ṽ
I(θ′, θ̂(x− − ε′), x− − ε′)/∂xt < 0. Hence, a profitable
deviation to x− − ε′ exists for some ε′ > 0, contradicting optimality of x(θ′).
We establish differentiability by applying the proof strategy for Proposition 2 in Mailath
(1987). Let g(θ, θ̂, x) ≡ Ṽ I(θ, θ̂, x) − Ṽ I(θ, θ′, x(θ′)), for a given θ′ > θ̄(λt), and let θ
′′ > θ′.
Then, optimality of x(θ′) implies g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≤ 0, and optimality of x(θ′′) implies that
g(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ 0. Letting a = (αθ′ + (1− α)θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), for some α ∈ [0, 1] this implies
0 ≥ g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) ≥ −gθ(θ
′, θ′′, x(θ′′))(θ′′ − θ′)− 12gθθ(a)(θ
′′ − θ′)2,
where the second inequality follows from first-order Taylor expanding g(θ′′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around
(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) and rearranging the expanded terms using the latter optimality condition.
Expanding further g(θ′, θ′′, x(θ′′)) around (θ′, θ′, x(θ′)), using the mean value theorem on
gθ(θ
′, θ′′, x(θ′′)), and noting that g(θ′, θ′, x(θ′)) = gθ(θ










′′)− x(θ′)) + g
θ̂x





′′ − θ′)− gθx(b(β
′))(x(θ′′)− x(θ′)),
for b(β) = (θ′, βθ′ + (1− β)θ′′, βx(θ′) + (1− β)x(θ′′)) and some β, β′ ∈ [0, 1]. Because Ṽ I is
twice differentiable, all the derivatives of g are finite. Moreover, continuity of x implies that
x(θ′′) → x(θ′) as θ′′ → θ′ and, therefore, for θ′′ → θ′,
0 ≥ g
θ̂





′, θ′, x(θ′)) ≥ 0.
By Lemma 3, x and, hence, θ̂ are strictly increasing for all θ ≥ θ̄(λt). Arguing similarly as we
did to show continuity, optimality of x, therefore, requires that gx = ∂Ṽ
I/∂xt 6= 0 and, hence,
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Lemma 5. x(θt, λt) = ξ(θt) for all θt > θ̄(λt), where ξ is unique and ∂ξ/∂θt > 0.
Proof. From Lemma 4 we have that ξ is differentiable, and by Lemma 3, ∂ξ/∂θt > 0. We
thus only need to show that ξ is unique. By the proof to Lemma 4, dx/dθt is pinned down
by the partial differential equation (11), which must hold for all xt ≥ x(θ̄(λt)). Moreover,
whenever θ̄(λt) < 1, in equilibrium θ̂(x(1)) = 1 and, therefore, it obviously must hold
that x(1, λt) = argmaxxt Ṽ
I(1, 1, xt), providing a boundary condition for (11). Because Ṽ
I
is independent of λt, it follows that x(θt, λt) is uniquely characterized by a function, i.e.,
ξ : θt 7→ xt, for all θt ≥ θ̄(λt).
Lemma 6. θ̄(λt) is unique.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that θ̄(λt) is not unique. Then there exist θ̄
′′ > θ̄′, defining
two distinct equilibria for a given λt. By Lemma 5, there is a unique ξ(θ) characterizing
reforms outside the pool for both equilibria. Optimality for type θ ∈ (θ̄′, θ̄′′) then requires
Ṽ I(θ, θ, ξ(θ)) ≥ Ṽ I(θ,E{θt|θt ≤ θ̄
′}, λt) in the equilibrium defined by θ̄
′, and Ṽ I(θ, θ, ξ(θ)) ≤
Ṽ I(θ,E{θt|θt ≤ θ̄
′′}, λt) in the equilibrium defined by θ̄
′′. However, Ṽ I(θ,E{θt|θt ≤ θ̄
′}, λt) >
Ṽ I(θ,E{θt|θt ≤ θ̄
′′}, λt), a contradiction.
This establishes uniqueness of x(θt, λt), with all properties given by Lemmas 3 and 5, and
the corresponding beliefs θ̂(λt, xt) following from Lemma 2 and Bayesian updating. Again,
for the purpose of clarity we have established this proposition by focusing on pure strategy
equilibria. In the following we outline how the proof generalizes to mixed strategy equilibria;
a detailed version of these steps can be attained from the authors on request.
Replicating the proof of Lemma 1, it is trivial to show that if Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x′), x′) =
Ṽ I(θ′, θ̂(x′′), x′′), then Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x′), x′) < Ṽ I(θ′′, θ̂(x′′), x′′) for all θ′ < θ′′ and x′ < x′′. It
follows that (i) supports, X (θ), are non-overlapping, and (ii) minX (θ′′) ≥ maxX (θ′). More-
over, noting that x̃(θ) ≡ maxX (θ) has a jump-discontinuity if and only if type θ mixes in a
nondegenerate way, (ii) further implies that there can be only finitely many types that mix on
the closed interval [0, 1]. The logic of Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 then apply, ruling out any jumps of
x̃ on [θ̄(λt), 1]. This leads to the conclusion that at most a mass zero of types (i.e., θt = θ̄(λt))
could possibly mix in any equilibrium (with no impact on θ̂) and, thus, there is no need to
consider any nondegenerate mixed strategies.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From the discussion in the main body of the paper it is clear that the equilibrium is uniquely
pinned down by the time-invariant mappings given by Propositions 1 and 2 if it exists.
Existence requires that the candidate equilibrium also is consistent with the D1 criterion.
This is true by construction and can be seen from the proof of Proposition 2 where we apply
Lemma 2 to restrict off-equilibrium beliefs, such that θ̂ is necessarily consistent with the D1
criterion.
B Becoming an insider is optimal
Here we show formally that outsiders have no incentives to ever refuse becoming enfranchised.
To show this, we need to show that





A lower bound on the utility as an enfranchised insider is u(1), since xt = 1 is in the choice set
of insiders; i.e., by revealed preferences it holds that (1−p(·, xt))u(xt) ≥ (1−p(·, 1))u(1) = u(1).
When the best outside option is to not support a revolt, the result trivially follows from
u(1) ≥ γit for all i and t. For the case, where an outsider’s best outside option is to revolt, an
upper bound on the utility is given by ψ(1) = h(1)u(1), since by Assumption A1 revolts are
more rewarding when they have more supporters; i.e., θ̂tψ(st) ≤ ψ(st) ≤ ψ(1). Noting that
h(1) ≤ 1 gives the result.
C Learning dynamics
In this appendix we characterize the evolution of outsiders’ priors θt+1|δ
p
t , which jointly with
(7) define the dynamics in the model with learning.
Given our specification of F , it is sufficient to derive the first two moments for θt|δ
p
t . Once
we have µ̂t and σ̂
2
t , we can derive µt+1 and σ
2
t+1 from (8) and (9), which then pin down the













To obtain µ̂t and σ̂
2
t , we need to consider 3 cases. First, whenever insiders conduct reforms
xt > λt, the state is fully revealed so that µ̂t = θt and σ̂
2
t = 0. The same is true when there is
46
a revolt against a separating regime. Second, whenever insider abstain from reforms (xt = λt)
and a successful revolt is observed (ηt = 1), we use Bayes law to compute





where gat,bt(·) denotes the prior pdf with shape parameters at, bt, and gat,bt(·|θ ≤ θ̄t, ηt = 1) is
















Here M iat,bt(θ̄t) denotes the i-th raw moment of the θ̄t-truncated Beta-distribution,
M iat,bt(θ̄t) ≡ E{θ
i|θ ≤ θ̄t} = B(θ̄t, at + i, bt)/B(θ̄t, at, bt),
where B is the incomplete Beta function and where at and bt are the shape parameters of
the prior at t. Finally, when insiders abstain from reforms and no revolt is observed, we can
similarly use Bayes law to obtain
gat,bt(θ|θ ≤ θ̄t, ηt = 0) =
1− θh(st)
∫ θ̄t
























It remains to be checked that the resulting moments are consistent with a Beta distribution.
In general, any combination of µt and σt is consistent with some at and bt (and uniquely so),
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if σ2t < µt(1− µt), or equivalently
πσ̂2t + (1− π)σ
2
0 + π(1− π)(µ̂t − µ0)
2
< [πµ̂t + (1− π)µ0]× [π(1− µ̂t) + (1− π)(1− µ0)]
= π2µ̂t(1− µ̂t) + (1− π)
2µ0(1− µ0)
+ π(1 − π) [µ̂t(1− µ0) + (1− µ̂t)µ0] . (12)
By assumption, σ20 < µ0(1− µ0). Further, suppose for a moment that σ̂
2
t ≤ µ̂t(1− µ̂t). Then
subtracting the known inequalities and dividing by π(1− π), (12) simplifies to
σ̂2t + σ
2
0 < µ̂t(1− µ̂t) + µ0(1− µ0),
which is true under the maintained assumption. Hence, a sufficient condition for µt and σt to




t } ≤ E{θ|δ
p
t }. Given
that θt ∈ [0, 1], this is trivially true, which concludes the proof. (Note how the addition of
nondegenerate noise in the event of a redraw suffices to retain the strict inequality for the
prior, even when the posterior has zero variance and unit mean).
To summarize, outsiders’ beliefs at date t can be recursively computed, where we use the
updating formulas derived above to go from (µt, σ
2
t )—or, equivalently, (at, bt)—to (µ̂t, σ̂
2
t ),
and then apply (8) and (9) to go to (µt+1, σ
2
t+1) and (at+1, bt+1).
D Cost of reforms and equilibrium dynamics
In this appendix we show how variations in the cost of reforming, β1, impact the equilibrium
dynamics and the long-run distribution of political systems. For simplicity, we focus on the
model with exogenous priors, but analogous conclusions apply to the case with learning.
As alluded to in the main text, variations in the cost of reforms affect equilibrium dynamics
by changing the frequency of reforms relative to the frequency of revolts. To see this, consider
Figure 18. Here we display a simulated time series for different values of β1 and for 300
periods each. To make the three parametrization comparable, we keep the sequence of {θt}
fixed across all three specifications, which is drawn from a uniform distribution F . Similar,
we fix the random sequence of quantile ranks that determine the realizations of {ηt}, so that
any differences in transition dynamics are purely driven by deterministic changes in QS , QR,
ρS and ρR that are due to the variations in β1.
For each time path, we plot the political system, λt, at time t, and indicate the dates
where transitions occur via revolts (marked by ∆) and reforms (marked by ×). It can be seen


























Figure 18. Simulated time series of the model with exogenous priors. Notes: Reforms are marked by “×”,
successful revolts are marked by “△”. Costs of reforms (β1) are increasing from Setting 1 to 3.
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and the absence of successful subversive attempts. As the costs of reforms are increasing
in Setting 2 (β1 = 0.40) and Setting 3 (β1 = 0.45), insiders initially prefer to abstain from
reforms and gamble for their survival—despite facing the same sequence of θt. Their gambling
for survival eventually leads to a successful revolt in Settings 2 and 3 in periods 12 and 15.
Given the realization of θ16, insiders then conduct reforms in period 16 for intermediate costs
β1, but continue to gamble for their survival in the case of high costs. The paths converge
back towards each other in period 47, when insiders eventually reform in the case of high costs
(the convergence is not perfect though, since given high costs of reforming the reforms will be
less inclusive for larger values of β1).
33 Around period 200, we then observe a reversal for
intermediate and high values of β1, while the more inclusive democracy in the case of small
costs is sufficiently stable to survive the threat. The subsequent periods then show similar
patterns, where insiders conduct reforms for intermediate values of β1 and abstain in the high
value case.
Despite these differences in the frequency of reforms and revolts, the observed patterns
of stable democracies, instable autocracies, and polarization are similar across specifications.
Mirroring our results in the model with learning (Section 6), the long-run distribution with
exogenous priors is hence bimodal with mass concentrated on the extremes. Variations in β1
thereby manifest themselves in shifts between the long-run mass on autocratic and democratic
regimes. Figure 19 shows this, plotting the invariant distribution of political systems for
various values of β1 obtained from running a kernel density regression on simulated time
series of 3.2 Million observations each.34 For low values of β1 (Settings 1 and 2), reforms are
likely relative to revolts such that mass is mainly concentrated on democratic systems. The
converse is true when the costs of conducting reforms are high (Settings 3 and 4).
33The inclusiveness of reformed regimes also differs across specifications, since reforms ξ(θt) depend on the
precise realization of θt which differs across dates.
34To retain a constant scale across all settings, we smooth the simulated distribution using a bandwidth of
0.025. Somewhat hidden by this is that in Setting 4 all mass is collapsed into a single mass point at λ = 0.12,
which in Setting 4 is absorbing. More generally, there are two scenarios under which a certain political system
can be absorbing. First, if ξ(1) = 1, then λ arbitrary closely to 1 is reached in equilibrium, which is almost
surely absorbing. However, since ξ(1) < 1 in all of the reported settings, we do not observe λ → 1 along any
of the equilibrium paths. Second, if there exists a λ̃, such that θ̄(λ̃) = 1 and s(µ, λ̃) = λ̃, then the system






























Figure 19. Invariant distribution of political systems. Note: Costs of reforms (β1) are increasing from
Setting 1 to 4.
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